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Somebody Else’s Problem: How
the United States and Canada
Violate International Law and
Fail to Ensure the Prosecution
of War Criminals
Nicholas P. Weiss *
The United States and Canada have created programs to
ensure that they will not be havens for war criminals and human
rights violators. This, however, fails to meet their international
legal obligation to ensure that suspected war criminals and
human rights violators will be prosecuted for their crimes. This
Note analyzes and compares the war crimes prosecution policies
of Canada and the United States. It concludes that both
countries take inadequate measures to ensure war criminals are
prosecuted for their crimes, and thus, these countries are failing
to meet their international obligations. This Note recommends
both countries implement statutes to ensure suspected war
criminals are prosecuted, forcing Canada and the United States
to conform to their international obligations.

CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 580

II. CANADA DOES NOT ENSURE THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ............................................... 583
A. Canada’s Jurisdiction.................................................................. 584
B. Canada’s History of Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity .................................................... 585
C. Canada’s Preference for Removal of War Crimes Suspects .............. 587
III. The United States Does Not Ensure the Prosecution of
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity ........................... 590
A. United States’ Jurisdiction ........................................................... 590
B. The United States’ History of Investigation and Prosecution of
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity .................................. 591
C. The United States’ Preference for Using Immigration Law Against
War Crimes Suspects ................................................................. 593

*

Senior Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law;
B.A., The College of Wooster (2009); J.D., Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (expected 2013). Thanks to my advisor,
Professor Michael Scharf and the staff of the Journal of International
Law, especially Helena Traner and Adam Centner, for making this Note
possible.

579

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Somebody Else’s Problem
IV. International Legal Obligations Violated by the United
States and Canada ................................................................. 595
A. Obligation to Ensure Prosecution.................................................. 595
B. Customary International Law is Changing to Support Ensuring
Prosecution of War Criminals..................................................... 600
C. Criticism of Canada’s Policies ..................................................... 604
D. Criticism of the United States’ Policies ......................................... 605
V. Recommendations for the United States and Canada ............. 606
A. Solutions Going Forward: Canada ................................................ 606
B. Solutions Going Forward: United States ........................................ 607
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................... 609

I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2011, the Canadian government asked its citizens to help
it in the hunt for thirty suspected war criminals living in Canada. 1
However, instead of bringing the war criminals to justice, Canada
began to remove them from the country without any guarantee the
suspects would be prosecuted. 2 Addressing criticism for failing to
ensure prosecution, Canada’s Safety Minister, Vic Toews, declared
“Canada is not the UN. It’s not our responsibility to make sure each
one of these [suspected criminals] faces justice in their own
countries[.]” 3 Thirty people suspected of war crimes may never be
prosecuted. Instead, they will simply go back to their lives. When
faced with the responsibility of ensuring that war criminals are
prosecuted, Canada chose practical expediency over justice.
This Note argues that both the United States and Canada have
abrogated their legal obligations by failing to ensure that war
criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity are brought to
justice. 4 These countries must either prosecute for substantive
offenses, or ensure that other states prosecute for the substantive
offenses if they are to prevent those who have committed atrocities
1.

See Ottawa Seeks ‘War Criminals’ Hiding in Canada, BBC, July 21,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14243919.

2.

See War Crimes Suspects’ Prosecution Uncertain, CBC NEWS, July 27,
2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/07/27/pol-war-cr
imes-prosecution.html.

3.

Laura Payton, War Crimes Prosecution Not Up to Canada, Toews
Says, CBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story
/2011/08/03/war-crimes-suspect-toronto-arrest.html.

4.

This Note in no way intends to denigrate the incredible work done by
both the United States and Canada in ensuring that war criminals and
those who commit crimes against humanity do not find safe harbor
within their borders. However, both countries still have not met the
obligations that have been established through international agreement.
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from going free. 5 Both the United States and Canada have overcome
their decades-long problems of insufficient temporal and geographic
jurisdictions to prosecute for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 6 However, simply possessing jurisdiction to prosecute is not
sufficient to achieve the obligations set by treaty and custom. To
fulfill their international obligations, Canada and the United States
must ensure the war criminals and human rights violators within their
borders are prosecuted.
This Note is divided in five parts. Part II outlines the jurisdiction
and history of Canada’s successes and failures in ensuring the
prosecution of war criminals. Part III does the same for the United
States. Part IV analyzes the international obligations the United
States and Canada, failing to ensure prosecution of war criminals,
have violated. Part V advocates some statutory remedies both
Canada and the United States should enact to meet their legal
obligations.
Canada and the United States have made it a priority to identify
and apprehend individuals found in their borders who have committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 7 Within the past twenty
years, the different strategies employed by each country to apprehend
and bring to justice such individuals have begun to converge. 8
Starting in 1979, the United States began a serious effort to locate,
5.

Thanks to Professor David Crane, former Chief Prosecutor of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone, for introducing me to the concept of the
beast of impunity and the absolute necessity of ensuring that those who
committed the worst atrocities cannot escape justice. Thanks to Eli
Rosenbaum, Director of Strategy and Policy of the Human Rights and
Special Prosecutions Section of the US Department of Justice; Robert
Petit, Counsel for the War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Section of the Canada Department of Justice; and Matt Eisenbrandt,
Legal Counsel for the Canadian Center for International Justice for
agreeing to be interviewed for this Note.

6.

The United States has jurisdiction to prosecute for grave breaches of
international law, crimes against humanity, and war crimes through
several statutes. See Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340(A) (2001); War Crimes,
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); Recruitment or Use of Child Soldiers, 18
U.S.C. § 2442 (2008); Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009); Section to
Enforce Human Rights Laws, 28 U.S.C. § 509B (2010). Canada now has
jurisdiction through the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.).

7.

Canada instituted a statute in 1987 granting jurisdiction to prosecute
for war crimes and crimes against humanity for any person in Canada as
if they had committed the crime in Canada. Act to Amend the Criminal
Code, S.C. 1987, c. 37 (Can.). Canada replaced the 1987 legislation in
2000 with the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. See
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.).

8.

For the purposes of this Note, I will not address civil damages, only
criminal punishment.
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apprehend, and deport war crimes suspects, particularly those
associated with the Nazi genocide. 9 Canada, on the other hand, held
the unfortunate stigma of being a haven for Nazi war criminals and
did not truly begin apprehending suspected war criminals until 1995. 10
The United States has largely either removed suspected war
criminals from the country or prosecuted these individuals for
naturalization or immigration fraud. 11 This is partly because the
United States only recently passed legislation granting universal
jurisdiction for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 12 Canada, on
the other hand, tends to remove suspects from Canada rather than
seek any kind of criminal prosecution. 13 Both are responding to the
9.

The Simon Wiesenthal Center, an NGO that monitors and ranks
countries’ effectiveness at investigating and prosecuting Nazi war
criminals, has given the United States the highest ranking of any
country every year since the center’s inception in 2002. EFRAIM ZUROFF,
WORLDWIDE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
27 (2010). The Wiesenthal Center notes:

Id.

Since its establishment in 1979, the [Office of Special
Investigations], recently renamed the Human Rights and Special
Prosecution Section, (HRSPS) [sic] currently headed by Eli M.
Rosenbaum, Esq., has conducted the most successful program of
its kind in the world, and has been a model of proactive
investigation and prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators for the
past three decades. Its outstanding performance has earned it
unique status, as the only agency to have received the highest
possible grade every single year since this report was launched in
2002.

10.

Until 1982, no action, not even a deportation, was enacted against the
estimated 3,000 Nazi war criminals living in Canada following World
War II. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Says It Will Punish War
Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995
/04/09/world/canada-says-it-will-punish-war-criminals.html. In the mid1990s, Canada created an organization to coordinate the search for war
criminals. CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY ET AL., ELEVENTH ANNUAL
REPORT: CANADA’S PROGRAM ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR
CRIMES 2007–2008, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca
/pubs/ wc-cg-eng.pdf [hereinafter CBSA REPORT 2008].

11.

Though the United States often will deport those who have lied on
naturalization forms, lying about especially heinous crimes can result in
severe punishment. In one instance, a former Guatemalan death squad
member was sentenced to ten years for lying about his involvement in a
massacre. See U.S. Jails Guatemalan Ex-Soldier for Hiding Massacre
Role, BBC, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latinamerica-11338246; Telephone Interview with Eli Rosenbaum, Dir. of
Hum. Rts. Enforcement Strategy and Pol’y, Hum. Rts. and Special
Prosecution Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Dec. 9, 2011) [hereinafter
Rosenbaum Interview].

12.

Section to Enforce Human Rights Laws, 28 U.S.C. § 509B (2010).

13.

See War Crimes Suspects’ Prosecution Uncertain, supra note 2.
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difficulties inherent in prosecuting war crimes that occurred far
outside their borders but are doing so in a way that violates
international legal obligations. The United States and Canada have
declined to prosecute suspected war criminals and opted instead to
either prosecute for immigration-related violations or deport without
assurances that those suspected of war crimes and crimes against
humanity will be prosecuted. Both states are bound by international
agreements to ensure prosecution, yet both have failed to meet their
international obligations. 14

II. CANADA DOES NOT ENSURE THE PROSECUTION OF WAR
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
While Canada has enacted legislation to prosecute war criminals
and human rights violators, the actual effect in prosecuting war
criminals has been fairly impotent. A combination of little political
will and restrictive Supreme Court rulings 15 has stymied domestic
prosecution of war criminals. To date, Canada has prosecuted,
convicted, and sentenced only a single war criminal. 16 Canada’s record
in ensuring that war criminals are prosecuted abroad once they have
14.

These agreements are spelled out in Section III, but include the Geneva
Conventions and the Torture Convention. See Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6, U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Article 49 reads:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Id. art. 49. See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].

15.

See Irwin Cotler, International Decision, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 461
(1996). The Canadian Department of Justice justified their change in
strategy in prosecuting suspected war criminals by saying of
the Finta case that “the Court established a higher standard of proof for
the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity than is
recognized at international law. For the World War II cases, this
decision has made prosecution of these crimes much more difficult and
less likely.” Id.

16.

See CBSA REPORT 2008, supra note 10, at 9–10 (reporting on the fate
of Desiré Munyaneza, a Rwandan citizen convicted in Canada for war
crimes committed in Rwanda).
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been removed from Canada is equally dismal. Canada has become
very effective at removing suspected war criminals, but not nearly as
effective in ensuring they face justice.
A.

Canada’s Jurisdiction

Canada has statutory jurisdiction to prosecute suspected war
criminals under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act
(“Canada War Crimes Act” or “the Act”). 17 The Canada War Crimes
Act was enacted on June 29, 2000 to domesticate the Rome Treaty. 18
It grants Canada the statutory jurisdiction to prosecute genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes, regardless of where or
against whom the crimes took place, and specifically permits
Canadian courts to prosecute crimes committed before the Act was
enacted. 19 With its retroactive provision, the Act grants Canada
greater jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals than even the Rome
Statute permits the International Criminal Court (ICC). 20 The
Canada War Crimes Act states that if an intentional killing forms the
basis of the offense, the perpetrator shall be imprisoned for life. 21 This
17.

See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24
(Can.).

18.

See id. pmbl. (“An Act respecting genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes and to implement the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, and to make consequential amendments to other
Acts.”).

19.

Id. § 6(1)–(1.1). The statue reads:
(1) Every person who, either before or after the coming into
force of this section, commits outside Canada
(a) genocide,
(b) a crime against humanity, or
(c) a war crime,
is guilty of an indictable offence and may be prosecuted for that
offence in accordance with section 8.

Id.

(1.1)Every person who conspires or attempts to commit, is an
accessory after the fact in relation to, or counsels in relation to,
an offence referred to in subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable
offence.

20.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 11, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article 11 of the
Rome Statute limits temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to the date of its founding. Id. Article 25 denies
jurisdiction over persons under 18 at the times of their alleged offense.
Id. art. 25. The Canada War Crimes Act has no imposed age limitations
for prosecution. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act,
S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.).

21.

Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, art. 4(2), S.C. 2000, c.
24 (Can.).

584

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Somebody Else’s Problem

is a substantially more stringent standard than the Rome Statute,
which merely permits the ICC to imprison a suspect for a term of
years up to life. 22
B.

Canada’s History of Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity

Canada’s expansion of jurisdiction was driven in large part by
Canada’s unfortunate legacy of permissiveness towards war
criminals. 23 Some organizations estimate that as many as 3,000 Nazi
war criminals fled to Canada after World War II. 24 Following
condemnation by international organizations, Canada adjusted its
criminal code in 1987 to enable the prosecution of Nazi war criminals
living in Canada. 25 Yet, the 1987 legislation is largely considered a
failure. 26 Only four prosecutions were ever attempted. 27 Three of the
accused had their charges dropped outright, and the fourth ended in
acquittal. 28
The last attempt to prosecute Nazi war criminals in Canada
resulted in the acquittal of Imre Finta. 29 Canada charged Finta with
manslaughter, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, and robbery in
relation to his alleged activities as a police officer assisting the Nazis
in the forced deportation of 8,617 Jews from Szeged during the
Holocaust. 30 The Canadian Supreme Court made a bewildering ruling
in which it established a broad defense of superior orders that
22.

See Rome Statute, supra note 20, § 77 (limiting punishment to a
maximum of thirty years except in cases of extreme gravity, which allow
a sentence of life imprisonment).

23.

See About Us, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES PROG.,
DEP’T OF JUST. CANADA, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeg
uerre/crime-crime-eng.asp (last updated May 19, 2010).

24.

See Anthony DePalma, Canada Called Haven for Nazi Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A6.

25.

See About Us, supra note 23. This followed a 1986 report by the
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals which found that reports of
widespread Nazi war criminals living in Canada were true. Id.

26.

See DePalma, supra note 24. Until the legislation was updated in 2000,
Canada had prosecuted only four Nazi war criminals out of the
estimated thousands living in Canada with no convictions. Id.

27.

See id.

28.

See id.; Public Report, Canada’s War Crimes Program, CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIG. CANADA (July 21, 1998) [hereinafter Public Report 1998],
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/can_war_crimes_public_
report/1998/english/pub/war1998.html.

29.

See R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 705 (Can.) (dismissing the appeal
of acquittal at the trial level).

30.

See id. at 702.
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departed from international practice. 31 The court also applied a
heightened actus reus requirement found nowhere in either
international or Canadian law. 32
This ruling handicapped Canadian prosecution of war crimes and
reinforced the perception that Canada was not serious about
addressing the issue of suspected war criminals living in Canada. 33
While Canada could have reacted to this setback by increasing the
total deportation of war criminals, Canada successfully extradited or
deported only two suspected war criminals between 1980 and 1997. 34
Since the implementation of the War Crimes Prosecution Act,
only one person has been successfully prosecuted to conviction. 35 In
1997, Désiré Munyaneza emigrated from Rwanda to Canada. 36 In
2000, the same year as the passage of the Canada War Crimes Act,
the Immigration and Refuge Board rejected his application for refugee
status, finding reason to believe that Munyaneza had participated in
the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 37 Munyaneza was finally charged in
31.

See id. at 707. The court stated:

Id.

The defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer
defence are available to members of the military or police forces
in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Those defences are subject to the manifest illegality test: the
defences are not available where the orders in question were
manifestly unlawful. Even where the orders were manifestly
unlawful, the defence of obedience to superior orders and the
peace officer defence will be available in those circumstances
where the accused had no moral choice as to whether to follow
the orders. There can be no moral choice where there was such
an air of compulsion and threat to the accused that he or she
had no alternative but to obey the orders.

32.

See generally Irwin Cotler, War Crimes Law and the Finta Case, 6 SUP.
CT. L. REV. 577 (1995) (critiquing the court’s legal evaluation in Finta);
see also Cotler, supra note 15, at 467 (arguing the court
mischaracterized the elements of the actus reus).

33.

See Irwin Cotler, Bringing Nazi War Criminals in Canada to Justice: A
Case Study, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 262, 268 (1997) (asserting that
the ruling in Finta demonstrates “inadequate appreciation” for either
international law or the international aspects of national law and creates
“disturbing precedents and principles for war crimes generally”)
[hereinafter Cotler, A Case Study].

34.

See DePalma, supra note 24.

35.

Nazi War Criminals in Canada, CBC, May. 12, 2011, http://
www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/05/12/f-nazi-war-criminalscanada.html.

36.

See Desire Munyaneza, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/
trial-watch/trial-watch/profils/profile/423/action/show/controller/
Profile.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).

37.

See id.
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2005, after Rwandan-Canadians recognized him living in their
community. 38
Munyaneza was charged and convicted of seven counts of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for acts of murder,
sexual violence, and pillage committed in Rwanda in 1994. 39 He was
sentenced by the Quebec Superior Court on October 29, 2009. 40 The
court gave Munyaneza life without the possibility of parole for
twenty-five years. 41
The second and only other person to be indicted under the
Canada War Crimes Act is Jacques Mungwarere, also a Rwandan. 42
He was arrested on November 6, 2009, several weeks after
Munyaneza’s sentencing. 43 Mungwarere was ultimately charged with
one count of genocide and one count of crimes against humanity. 44
The trial began on April 30, 2012. 45
C.

Canada’s Preference for Removal of War Crimes Suspects

The Munyaneza and Mungwarere cases could have signaled an
end to the impunity granted to suspected war criminals in Canada.
Unfortunately, Canada has adopted a policy of deportation of
suspected war criminals, rather than seeking criminal prosecution. 46
Canada currently prosecutes suspected war criminals through the
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program (War Crimes
Program) in Canada’s Department of Justice. 47 Since 1998, the War
Crimes Program has been the coordinating force between the
Department of Justice, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Citizen
and Immigration in Canada, and the Canada Border Service Agency
(CBSA) in the search for and disposition of suspected war criminals. 48
38.

Nazi War Criminals in Canada, supra note 35.

39.

R. v. Munyaneza, 2009 Q.C.C.S. 2201, § 3.4 ¶ 129 (Can.)

40.

Id. § 9.

41.

Nazi War Criminals in Canada, supra note 35.

42.

Successes, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES PROGRAM,
DEP’T OF JUST. CANADA, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeg
uerre/successes-realisations-eng.asp (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).

43.

See id.

44.

CCIH’s Public Cases and Interventions, Jacques Mungwarere, CAN.
CTR. INT’L JUST., http://www.ccij.ca/programs/cases/index.php?DOC_
INST=19.

45.

Id.

46.

See Payton, supra note 3 (presenting Canada’s Public Safety Minister
Vic Toews’s argument that it is the responsibility of other countries, not
Canada, to prosecute war criminals).

47.

See About Us, supra note 23.

48.

Id.
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This combination of authorities focuses on denying entry and
removing war crimes suspects from Canada. 49
The goal of the War Crimes Program is to ensure that Canada is
not a safe haven for war criminals. 50 Rather than prosecute war
criminals, the preferred method of justice has been the prevention of
the immigration of war criminals and the deportation of war crimes
suspects. 51 Although the current administrators of the War Crimes
Program tout their model as an example to the world, 52 Canada faces
significant criticism that its War Crimes Program does not go far
enough in ensuring that war criminals face justice. 53
In 1995, partially in response to the failed prosecution efforts, the
Canadian government switched its focus from prosecutions to
revocations of citizenship and deportations of suspected war
criminals. 54 These efforts were assisted in 2001 when Canada granted
itself power to deport suspected war criminals through the

49.

See id. The stated operational objectives are:

Id.

To prevent the admission to Canada of people involved in war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide; [t]o detect, at the
earliest possible opportunity, alleged perpetrators of war crimes,
crimes against humanity or genocide who are in Canada, and
take steps to prevent them from obtaining status or citizenship;
[t]o revoke the status or citizenship of individuals involved or
complicit in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide
who are in Canada, and remove them from Canada; and [t]o
examine all claims that there are suspected perpetrators of war
crimes and crimes against humanity living in Canada and, where
appropriate, investigate and prosecute these individuals.

50.

Id.

51.

CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY ET AL., TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT:
CANADA’S PROGRAM ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES
2008–2011, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/securitysecurite/wc-cg/bsf5039-eng.pdf [hereinafter CBSA REPORT 2011].

52.

See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program, DEPT. OF
JUST. CANADA, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeguerre/
crime-crime-eng.asp (last updated May 19, 2010) (stating that Canada’s
War Crimes Program is internationally recognized as being a highly
effective inter-departmental initiative).

53.

See Fannie Lafontaine, Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act on Trial: An Analysis of the Munyaneza Case, 8 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 269, 287 (2010) (criticizing, among other things, Canada’s
overreliance on administrative remedies instead of criminal prosecution
when dealing with war criminals); Cotler, A Case Study, supra note 33,
at 262–63 (arguing Canada has failed to enforce international criminal
law).

54.

See Public Report 1998, supra note 28.
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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 55 Between 1997 and 2008,
Canada removed 466 people under the Act for suspicion of war crimes
and crimes against humanity. 56
Canada’s politicians have found it far easier to simply deport
suspected war criminals rather than extradite or prosecute them. 57
Many Canadian policymakers support the deportation option, and
many have commented that Canada has no intention, and should
have no intention, of using the power of the Canada War Crimes Act
to prosecute foreigners. 58 Other Canadian officials see this as the
natural right of Canada to protect its own borders. 59
Canada’s policymakers also seem to be responding, in part, to
public opinion on suspected war criminals generally. In a public
opinion poll, CBC News found that a majority of Canadians polled
favored deportation without condition of prosecution for suspected
war criminals living in Canada. 60 In response to this public sentiment,

55.

See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.).
Section 35 states:
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on
grounds of violating human or international rights for
(a) committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an
offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act;
(b) being a prescribed senior official in the service of a
government that, in the opinion of the Minister, engages or
has engaged in terrorism, systematic or gross human rights
violations, or genocide, a war crime or a crime against
humanity within the meaning of subsections 6(3) to (5) of
the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act . . . .
Id. § 35.

56.

CBSA REPORT 2008, supra note 10, at 14. The Immigration Act itself
was amended in several times. Its current status is a result of 2002
legislation, renaming it the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.).

57.

See CBSA REPORT 2008, supra note 10, at 1 (“The primary goal of the
War Crimes Program is to deny safe haven in Canada to war criminals .
. . .”).

58.

See Payton, supra note 3 (noting Canada’s Public Safety Minister Vic
Toews’s preference for other countries to conduct prosecutions)

59.

Telephone Interview with Robert Petit, Counsel, Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Sect., Canada Dep’t of Just., (Feb. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter Petit Interview]. When asked what factors were taken into
consideration in choosing to deport those being sought by the
government, Mr. Petit responded “there is really only one [factor], if the
individual has no right to be in Canada.” Id.

60.

See How Should Canada Handle Alleged War Criminals?, CBC NEWS,
July 29, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/yourcommunity/2011/07/ howshould-canada-handle-alleged-war-criminals.html (revealing a non-
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Canada’s politicians have attempted to frame the decision to expel
war criminals rather than prosecute as a response to public opinion. 61
Recently, Canada has become more public and aggressive in
identifying and removing suspected war criminals. In July of 2011, the
CBSA sought the public’s assistance in apprehending and deporting
thirty suspected war criminals living in Canada. 62 As of this writing,
five war criminals have been apprehended by the CBSA and three
have been removed as a result of the program. 63 Canada has no
statutory obligation to verify that any person removed for suspicion of
war crimes and crimes against humanity will be prosecuted once they
are removed. 64

III. The United States Does Not Ensure the
Prosecution of War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity
The United States has an excellent record of locating suspected
war criminals, especially former Nazis. 65 However, once it has located
them, the United States has largely chosen either to try them for
immigration or naturalization fraud, or remove the suspects from the
United States without adequate assurance that they will be
prosecuted. This violates the United States’ legal obligation to ensure
the prosecution of suspected war criminals.
A.

United States’ Jurisdiction

The United States has statutory jurisdiction to prosecute war
criminals for war crimes, 66 genocide, 67 torture, 68 or use of child
scientific survey of reader responses showing support for deportation
without due process).
61.

See Payton, supra note 3 (noting Towes’s preference for removal was a
matter of safety for the Canadian public and public interest).

62.

Id.

63.

Fifth Suspected War Criminal in Custody, PUB. SAFETY CANADA (July
28, 2011), http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2011/nr20110728eng.aspx?rss=false; Third Individual on CBSA ‘Wanted’ List Removed
from Canada, CANADA BORDER SERV. AGENCY (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/release-communique/2011/2011-0811-eng.html.

64.

See Payton, supra note 3.

65.

See ZUROFF, supra note 9, at 5 (awarding the highest grade to the
United States for successful war crime prosecutions).

66.

War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)–(b) (2006).

67.

Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2009).

68.

Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b) (2001).
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soldiers. 69 These acts have limited temporal jurisdiction. 70 They do
not permit prosecution for any crime committed prior to their
enactment, and, in the case of war crimes and the 1988 genocide
statute (pre-revision), do not apply to non-United States citizens
unless the crimes were committed against U.S. citizens. 71
The limits of jurisdiction have resulted in creative prosecution.
For many years, criminal proceedings against suspected war criminals
for substantive crimes were not possible in the United States due to
lack of statutory jurisdiction. 72 If the United States wanted to initiate
any criminal proceeding, prosecutors were forced to prove immigration
fraud or naturalization fraud. 73 Even this proved difficult, as the
statutes of limitations on naturalization fraud and visa fraud were ten
years and five years respectively. 74
B.

The United States’ History of Investigation and Prosecution of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

Until 1979, prosecution and deportation of suspected Nazi war
criminals living in the United States were conducted through the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 75 This arrangement was an
enormous failure. From the end of World War II to 1979 only two
Nazi persecutors were removed from the United States. 76 Some
evidence indicates that the Immigration and Naturalization Service

69.

Recruitment or Use of Child Soldiers, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2008).

70.

The United States Constitution prohibits the prosecution of crimes that
were not illegal at the time they were committed through the ex post
facto clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; but see Eric S. Kobrick, The
Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction
Over International Crimes, 87 COL. L. REV. 1515, 1528 (1987) (arguing
that crimes of universal jurisdiction may be prosecuted without violating
the ex post facto clause).

71.

18 U.S.C. § 2441(b).

72.

See Eli M. Rosenbaum, An Introduction to the Work of the Office of
Special Investigations, USA BULLETIN, Jan. 2006, at 1 (noting the
constitutional limitations on criminal proceedings, which have forced the
Department of Justice to turn to deportation and removal actions); but
see Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Jurisdiction to
Nationals of Non-State Parties, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 366 (2001)
(arguing, in part, that certain crimes, including torture, genocide, and
other crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction even
without direct statutory approval.)

73.

Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11.

74.

Id.

75.

Rosenbaum, supra note 72, at 2.

76.

See id.
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actually intentionally assisted many Nazis in their attempts to enter
the country. 77
To rectify the situation, in 1979 the United States created the
Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to investigate and prosecute
suspected Nazi war criminals living in the United States. 78 The
program was enormously successful in seeking out former Nazis. By
2008, the OSI had launched—and won—proceedings against 107
people linked to Nazi-era war crimes. 79
The United States gradually began shifting their focus from Nazi
war criminals to a more general search for modern war criminals and
human rights abusers. This shift was motivated, in part, by a series of
reports in the early 1990s, which concluded that the United States
was being used as a safe haven for human rights violators, especially
torturers. 80 In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence and Terrorism
Prevention Act, giving OSI the added responsibility of bringing civil
and criminal denaturalization cases against modern day war criminals
and human rights abusers. 81 In 2009, OSI was merged into the Human
Rights and Special Prosecution Section within the Department of
Justice. 82
Other organizations cooperate with the Human Rights and Special
Prosecution Section. The Human Rights Violators and War Crimes
Unit of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is tasked with
preventing foreign war crimes suspects, persecutors, and human rights
abusers from entering the United States. 83 It also identifies,
prosecutes, and removes suspected war criminals and human rights
abusers from the United States. 84
The US record on successful prosecution and conviction for war
crimes and crimes against humanity is less impressive than that of
Canada. In 2008, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, son of Charles Taylor,
77.

See Eric Lichtblau, Nazis Were Given ‘Safe Haven’ in U.S., Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, at A1.

78.

Rosenbaum, supra 72, at 2.

79.

See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11.

80.

See William J. Aceves, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A SAFE HAVEN FOR
TORTURERS 22–24 (2002) (noting the United States has failed to
prosecute a single individual for torture since criminalizing acts of
torture committed outside the United States in 1994).

81.

See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 50 U.S.C. §
5505(b)(1) (2004).

82.

See Human Rights Enforcement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2009).

83.

See Overview, The Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, US
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/human-rightsviolators/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter War Crimes Unit
Overview].

84.

Id.
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former president of Liberia and convicted war criminal, received a 97year sentence under the 1994 Torture Statute. 85 He was the first, and
so far only, person to be prosecuted under the Torture Statute. 86
Aside from Taylor, the United States has not completed any kind of
domestic criminal prosecution for war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
C.

The United States’ Preference for Using Immigration Law Against
War Crimes Suspects

The United States’ general policy towards those suspected of war
crimes and crimes against humanity has been to deny them a safe
haven. 87 If a suspected war criminal enters the United States, the
United States has several options to deal with the suspect. It may
criminally prosecute for the underlying offense, 88 criminally prosecute
for naturalization or immigration fraud, 89 extradite the suspect to
another country, 90 or deport the suspect. 91
Like Canada, the United States’ most common solution for
suspected war criminals and human rights violators is removal from
the country. The removal process does not require any guarantee that
the recipient country prosecute. Since 2004, the Human Rights
Violators and War Crimes Unit, the unit responsible for apprehending
and removing suspects of war crimes and crimes against humanity,

85.

See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the trial court’s 97-year sentence).

86.

See Q & A: Charles ‘Chuckie’ Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States
for Torture Committed in Liberia, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Sept. 23,
2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylorjr-s-trial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia (noting Taylor was the
first ever prosecuted under the Torture Statute).

87.

See War Crimes Unit Overview, supra note 83 (describing the “No Safe
Haven Initiative”).

88.

See supra Part III(A) (outlining the United States’ jurisdiction over war
crimes).

89.

See Naturalization, Citizenship or Alien Registry, 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f)
(2000); Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits and Other Documents, 18
U.S.C. § 1546(a)–(c) (2002). For suspected war criminals, this duty falls
on the Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section of the
Department of Justice. See Our Mission, The Human Rights and Special
Prosecution Section, DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/hrsp/.

90.

See Fugitives from State, Territory, or Possession into Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of United States, 18 USC § 3183 (2002).

91.

See War Crimes Unit Overview, supra note 83 (describing the unit’s
authority to deport suspected war criminals and human rights
violators).
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has removed over 540 suspected human rights violators. 92 While this
mass deportation of suspected war criminals is consistent with the
goal of denying war criminals a safe haven, it does nothing to ensure
that human rights abusers are actually brought to justice.
This does not mean that the United States will always choose to
deport rather than extradite or prosecute. “We do have a strong
national interest in seeing that our immigration and citizenship laws
are not violated,” said Eli Rosenbaum, Director of Human Rights
Enforcement Strategy and Policy of the Human Rights and Special
Prosecution Section of the US Department of Justice. 93 “[I]f we have a
provable case of visa or naturalization fraud, we generally are
interested in prosecuting those cases,” he explained. 94 Generally, the
legal and economic value of deportation wins out, as “[f]rom the
standpoint of the American taxpayer, it is very cost effective.” 95
Ensuring that war criminals stand trial for their substantive
crimes is often incredibly difficult. According to Rosenbaum
“extradition is a much faster process than denaturalization and
deportation. Alas, there were very few requests for extradition. There
were many attempts made by the Justice Department to persuade
other countries . . . to request extradition, but they very rarely did.” 96
The United States’ policy in choosing whether to prosecute or
deport is determined case-by-case. 97 The United States generally
prefers human rights violators be tried in their home countries. 98 In
Rosenbaum’s view, “we generally favor extradition both because the
evidence tends to exist in the country in which the crimes took place .
. . [and it] permits the community whose laws were violated to see
justice being done.” 99
If the United States chooses not to remove a war crimes suspect,
it will frequently use domestic immigration law to prosecute suspected
war criminals, but not for the actual war crime or crime against
humanity. 100 Some of these prosecutions have resulted in significant
punishment but nowhere near the punishment of a war crimes
92.

Id.

93.

Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

See id. (“[T]here is a preference in the law for people to be tried in the
locality in which the crime occurred. Or, at least, in the country in
which the crime occurred, if that’s possible.”).

99.

Id.

100. See id. (noting the United States will prosecute for immigration or
naturalization crimes if those crimes are provable).
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conviction. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Gilberto
Jordan with naturalization fraud. 101 Jordan was a Guatemalan soldier
who helped to commit one of the most brutal mass killings in the
history of the Guatemalan civil war, the massacre of Dos Erres, in
1982. 102 Jordan was sentenced to ten years in federal prison, the
highest sentence allowed for criminal naturalization fraud. 103
In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested
Lazare Kabaya Kobagaya of Topeka, Kansas.104 Mr. Kobagaya was
suspected of participating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 105 Rather
than charging Kobagaya with genocide, for which the United States
has jurisdiction under the Genocide Statute, 106 the United States
charged him with one count of unlawful procurement of naturalization
and one count of misuse of an alien registration card. 107 Kobagaya
faces up to ten years in prison, automatic revocation of his
citizenship, and a fine of up to $250,000 for the unlawful procurement
of citizenship charge. 108 He also faces up to ten years in prison and a
fine of up to $250,000 for the misuse of an alien registration card
charge. 109 Lacking the statutory jurisdiction to prosecute for the
underlying crime, the United States sought prosecution for the next
most serious offense available.

IV. International Legal Obligations Violated by the
United States and Canada
A.

Obligation to Ensure Prosecution

The international obligation to ensure that suspected war
criminals and human rights violators are prosecuted comes from the
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Kansas Man Charged with Immigration
Crimes in Connection with 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (Apr. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Press Release, Kansas Man Charged], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-385.html.
105. See id.
106. See Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009) (providing the United States
with jurisdiction over any person in the United States for the crime of
genocide).
107. Press Release, Kansas Man Charged, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Convention), 110 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture
Convention), 111 and from emerging customary international law. 112
Both conventions mandate ratifying countries to either prosecute or
remove for the purpose of prosecution persons suspected of
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. 113
Unfortunately, the plain language of the agreements has been ignored
by many signatories, including the United States and Canada. 114
The Geneva Conventions, to which Canada and the United States
are parties, 115 mandate states party to the convention to ensure
prosecution for grave breaches under international law. 116 While the
Conventions do not refer explicitly to war crimes or crimes against
humanity, the grave breaches condemned in the Conventions overlap
with the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 117
110. Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49.
111. Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(1).
112. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 20; see generally G.A. Res. 60/147,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) (adopting the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law); S.C. Res. 1325,
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31. 2000) (emphasizing the need for
all states to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, including sexual violence); S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 4, S/RES/1820
(June 19, 2008) (noting states’ responsibility to prosecute war crimes,
including sexual violence).
113. See Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49; Torture Convention,
supra note 14, art. 6(1).
114. See Telephone Interview with Matt Eisenbrandt, Legal Counsel for
Canadian Ctr. for Int’l Just. (Nov. 23, 2011) (noting Canada’s
preference for deportation of suspected war criminals, despite the
concerns about the suspect being subjected to torture or show trials).
115. See Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, State Signatories, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?Read
Form&id=375&ps=P (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
116. See Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49.
117. For the purpose of this Note, war crimes and crimes against humanity,
while evolving in definition, for the purpose of this Note fit into the
definition established by the International Military Tribunal created at
Nuremberg to try major German war criminals. Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
The Charter defines war crimes as:
[M]urder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor . . . of
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities . . . or devastation not justified by military
necessity.
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Article 49 of the First Geneva Convention requires states to enact
legislation punishing grave breaches and to search for and bring
suspected war criminals before their own courts unless another State
has made a case for prosecuting them. 118 Article 50 defines grave
breaches as willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and
extensive destruction, and appropriation of property that is not
militarily justified. 119
Many commentators take for granted that Article 49 imposes an
obligation to either prosecute or extradite those who commit grave
breaches of international law. 120 While some have argued international
criminal law has allowed substantial discretion in ensuring
prosecution, 121 it is difficult to escape the plain language of the
Convention:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial
to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such
High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. 122

This language shows a clear and unequivocal duty to ensure the
prosecution of those who commit grave breaches, which includes war
crimes and human rights violations.
The Torture Convention also creates an obligation to ensure
prosecution. Article 6(1) of the Torture Conventions requires

Id. art. 6(b).
Crimes against humanity under the Charter include “murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions . . . in connexion [sic] with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.” Id. art 6(c).
118. See Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49.
119. Id. art. 50.
120. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 564 (1995) (“The penal system of the
Conventions requires the states parties to criminalize certain acts, and
to prosecute or extradite the perpetrators.”).
121. See Diane F. Orentlichert, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2551
(1991).
122. Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49.

597

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Somebody Else’s Problem

signatories take all alleged torturers in their borders into custody. 123
Article 7 of the Torture Convention states that if parties fail to
extradite suspected torturers, they must prosecute the torturers
domestically for the underlying offense. 124 (Organizations such as the
Canadian Center for International Justice frequently argue that both
the United States and Canada ignore the obligations to prosecute or
extradite torturers. 125)
Article 7(1) of the Torture Convention states “[t]he State Party in
territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed
any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” 126 For
the United States and Canada, this means that any person suspected
of committing torture anywhere must either be tried domestically or
extradited for the purposes of being tried for torture.
Some observers have argued Article 7(2) of the Torture
Convention exempts signatories from a strict obligation to
prosecute. 127 Article 7(2) states:
[A]uthorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the
law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph
2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and
conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which
apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1. 128

In both the United States and Canada, the dominant view is that
Article 7(2) only requires that states party to the Torture Convention
123. See Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 6(1) (“[A]ny State Party in
whose territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred
to in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take other legal
measures to ensure his presence.”)
124. Id. art. 7.
125. See Eisenbrandt Interview, supra note 114 (“If you’re talking about
torture then [the obligation] is the UN Convention on Torture. There it
is very clearly spelled out. The obligation is to either extradite for
prosecution or, if that is not an option, to prosecute in your own
country.”).
126. Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(1).
127. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN
TIMES OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY, 86–87 (2006) (arguing prosecutorial
discretion is essential, even though the exercise of such discretion is
essentially a decision to not enforce a law). Posner stresses the power of
the executive. However, he also argues that broad prosecutorial
discretion is given to Torture Convention signatories. Id.
128. Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(2).
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exercise the same level of prosecutorial discretion they exercise in
prosecuting any domestic crimes. 129
The view that Article 7(2) merely permits the same discretion to
prosecute torture as any other domestic crime ignores basic treaty
interpretation. The Vienna Convention on Treaties states “[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose.” 130 This means signatories of the
Torture Convention must maintain the same standards of fair
prosecution for suspects of torture that they would for any other
trial. 131 It does not and cannot mean a signatory may elect not to
prosecute, or extradite for prosecution, suspected torturers without
proper cause. 132
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently adopted this
interpretation of the Torture Convention in its landmark case
Belgium v. Senegal. 133 Belgium v. Senegal concerned the fate of the
former President of Chad, Hissène Habré. Before being ousted from
Chad in 1990, Habré had presided over 40,000 political killings and
widespread torture. 134 Habré then sought refuge in Senegal. 135 In 2009,
129. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11 (remarking that the United
States had an obligation only to deny human rights violators safe
haven); Petit Interview, supra note 59 (“I don’t think there [is an
international obligation to prosecute crimes against humanity] yet . . . .
You may be able to argue that in a generation or two, but I don’t think
at this stage you can certainly say it is part of international customary
law.”) In fairness to Mr. Rosenbaum, he qualified his answer in saying
that the United States has been prohibited by the ex post facto clause of
the U.S. Constitution from prosecuting many instances of torture which
occurred outside the United States. He anticipates many more cases to
be tried domestically now that the United States has statutory
jurisdiction. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11.
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
131. See CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN
ASSESSMENT 357 (2001) (“[T]he discretionary power could not extend so
far as to allow those responsible for torture to escape punishment.”)
132. See id.
133. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v.
Sen.), Judgment (July 20, 2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1
44/17064.pdf [hereinafter Belgium v. Senegal].
134. See US Inst. of Peace, Chad: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre,
His Accomplices and/or Accessories, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 81 (Neil J.
Kritz ed., 1992).
135. See Aaron Solomon, The Politics of Prosecutions Under the Convention
Against Torture, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 309, 310 (2001) (noting Senegal’s
failure to prosecute Habré while he resided there, despite indicting him).
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Belgium, after numerous attempts to extradite Habré for trial,
initiated an action against Senegal seeking Habré’s extradition or
prosecution based on the Torture Convention. 136 Belgium alleged that
Senegal’s refusal to prosecute Habré domestically or extradite him to
Belgium for prosecution violated provisions under the Torture
Convention and customary international law. 137
The ICJ accepted Belgium’s argument that the Torture
Convention creates a duty for signatories to prosecute, or extradite
for prosecution, suspected torturers. Moreover, the ICJ held that
Senegal’s failure to seek prosecution or extradition of Habré
constituted a breach of the Torture Convention. 138 It found
unanimously that Senegal must either prosecute Habré or extradite
him for the purpose of prosecution immediately. 139
B.

Customary International Law is Changing to Support Ensuring
Prosecution of War Criminals

Under customary international law, there does not yet appear to
be an obligation to prosecute or extradite war criminals and those
who have committed crimes against humanity. 140 Customary
international law has been defined as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law 141 and consists of state practice and opinio juris. 142
State practice refers to general and consistent practice by states, while
opinio juris means the practice is followed out of a belief of legal
obligation. 143 Overwhelmingly, most countries have chosen to deport
suspected war criminals; extraditing or prosecuting has proven to be
the exception rather than the rule. 144 The offices responsible for the
prosecution of war criminals in both the United States and Canada do

136. Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 133, ¶ 1.
137. Id.
138. See id. ¶¶ 88, 95, 122.
139. Id. ¶ 122.
140. See id. ¶ 122(2) (finding the court does not have authority to entertain
the claims of Belgium relating to alleged breaches of international law).
141. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38(1)(b)
(1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–11 (5th ed. 1998); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM,
POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 130 (1999).
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
142, § 102(2).

OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note

144. See supra Part III.
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not see any custom requiring prosecution of foreign war criminals for
their underlying offenses. 145
This custom, however, is changing. 146 Canada, along with many
other nations, has enacted legislation to domesticate the Rome
Statute. 147 The preamble of the Rome Statute implies a duty to
prosecute the universal crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. 148 In Judge Antonio Casesse’s iconic commentary
on the Rome Statute, he states that signatories have obligations to
see that serious breaches of international criminal law are punished. 149
Another commentator argues that the preamble of the Rome Statute,
while not formally creating a duty to prosecute, still presupposes a
duty to ensure prosecution. 150
The preamble of the Rome Statute is strong evidence for a change
in customary international law favoring state prosecution of war
criminals. It recalls that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes[.]” 151 This is consistent with the basic tenants of treaty
interpretation as laid out in the Vienna Convention. 152 Under Article
31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the preamble of any treaty is to be
used in interpreting the meaning of it. 153 While this may not be

145. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11 (remarking that often it is
impossible to get a country to even seek extradition for its nationals);
Petit Interview, supra note 59 (remarking that although such an
obligation may arise in a coming generation, there is nothing close a
customary obligation to prosecute at the current time).
146. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112, at III(4) (recognizing that
in cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law, states party have an
obligation to prosecute criminals or extradite such criminals found
within their borders for prosecution).
147. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, pmbl., S.C. 2000,
c. 24 (Can.).
148. See Rome Statute, supra note 20, pmbl.
149. See Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones, The Rome
Statute: A Tentative Assessment, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1906 (Antonio
Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
150. See Otto Triffterer, Legal and Political Implications of Domestic
Ratification and Implementation Processes, in THE ROME STATUTE AND
DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS 15–17 (Claus Kreβ & Flavia Lattanzi eds.,
2000).
151. See Rome Statute, supra note 20, pmbl.
152. See Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 31 (noting the preamble is
part of a treaty and shall be taken into account in interpretation).
153. See id. art. 31(2). The Vienna Convention says:
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enough to create an explicit duty within the Rome Statute itself, the
assumption of a duty stated in the preamble creates an inference that
there is already a pre-existing duty in customary international law to
seek out and ensure the prosecution of war criminals.
The General Assembly of the United Nations has referenced this
duty in several resolutions. In 2005, the General Assembly passed
Resolution 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law. 154 The preamble of the resolution
clearly stated that international law contains the obligation to
prosecute perpetrators of certain international crimes, and that the
duty to prosecute reinforces international legal obligations. 155 Section
III(4) of the Resolution states that in serious violations of
international humanitarian law constituting crimes under
international law, states have a duty to investigate, submit to
prosecution, and punish war criminals and human rights abusers. 156
The General Assembly also passed Resolution 3074, Principles of
International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity. 157 The resolution calls for member states to take necessary
domestic and international measures to halt and prevent war crimes
and crimes against humanity, including prosecuting or extraditing
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble
and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion
of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or
more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.
Id. (emphasis added).
154. See G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112.
155. See id. pmbl. The Resolution recalls:

Id.

[T]hat international law contains the obligation to prosecute
perpetrators of certain international crimes in accordance with
international obligations of States and the requirements of
national law or as provided for in the applicable statutes of
international judicial organs, and that the duty to prosecute
reinforces the international legal obligations to be carried out in
accordance with national legal requirements and procedures and
supports the concept of complementarity[.]

156. See id. § III(4).
157. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVII), U.N. GOAR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3074
(Dec. 3, 1973), at 78.
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suspects for prosecution. 158 Other UN agencies support this position.
In the draft code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1996,
Article 9 explicitly states that there is an obligation by states to
prosecute or extradite an individual alleged to have committed
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. 159
The UN Security Council has also supported the idea of an
obligation to ensure the prosecution of war criminals. In 2000, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which emphasized it is the
“responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.” 160 Eight years later, the Security Council passed
another resolution, in which it called upon member states to “comply
with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for [war
crimes and crimes against humanity]” and stressed the importance of
“ending impunity . . . as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking
sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation.” 161
Even if the prevailing customary international law does not
suggest that states must ensure the prosecution of war criminals, only
in limited circumstances will customary international law override the
enforcement of a treaty. 162 Using customary international law as an
excuse to ignore treaty obligations, as the United States and Canada
have done, would allow a collection of nations to effectively say one
thing, yet do another. Perhaps customary law does not yet support a
158. Id.
159. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
reprinted in 1996 U.N.Y.B. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1.
160. See S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 112, ¶ 11.
161. See S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 112, ¶ 4. The Resolution specifically
addresses gender-based crime, in the context of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. See id.
162. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 7 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
States may . . . dispense altogether with most rules of
international law. There are, however, a few rules from which no
derogation is permissible. The latter–rules of [j]us cogens, or
peremptory norms of general international law—have been
defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties 1969 . . . as norms accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character; and Article 64 contemplates the emergence of
new rules of [j]us cogens in the future.
Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
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hard rule that states must ensure that war crimes suspects are
prosecuted, but that time is certainly approaching.
C.

Criticism of Canada’s Policies

Canadian officials have made clear that they do not consider
actual prosecution of suspected war criminals to be a priority. 163 As
Public Safety Minister Vic Toews said, “Canada is not the UN. It’s
not our responsibility to make sure each one of these [suspected
criminals] faces justice in their own countries.” 164 Various
organizations and commentators have taken issue with Canada’s
overwhelming preference for deportation rather than prosecution or
extradition. 165 Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, 166 Amnesty
International, 167 and the Canadian Center for International Justice 168
are among the loudest voices. They claim Canada is failing its legal
obligations by not adequately ensuring that suspected war criminals
are prosecuted. 169
Unfortunately, Canada has chosen to address the issue of
suspected war criminals not with prosecution, or with extradition in
163. See, e.g., Payton, supra note 3.
164. Id.
165. Foremost among these are Amnesty Canada and the Canadian Center
for International Justice. The sole mandate of the Canadian Center for
International Justice is to work on accountability for torture and war
crimes when there is some connection to Canada. See Eisenbrandt
Interview, supra note 114.
166. See Letter from Catherine Morris, B.A., L.L.B., L.L.M. & Gail
Davidson, Exec. Dir., Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, to The
Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. (Aug. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.lrwc.org/recent-public-statements-against-amnesty-internat
ional-canada/(“[I]mmigration proceedings are not intended to take the
place of criminal proceedings.”).
167. See Jeff Davis & Robert Hiltz, Prosecute, Not Deport, Suspected War
Criminals: Amnesty, NAT’L POST, Aug. 5, 2011, http://news.nationa
lpost.com/2011/08/02/prosecute-not-deport-suspected-war-criminalsamnesty/.
168. See Stewart Bell, Man Deported in Alleged Cannibalism, War Crimes
Case, NAT’L POST, Apr. 28, 2011, http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/
04/28/man-deported-in-alleged-canabalism-war-crimes-case/.
169. Eisenbrandt points out:

Id.

The actual international legal obligation is to either prosecute
someone here or to extradite them to a country where they will
then stand trial . . . so deporting them does not comply with
Canada’s legal obligations. On top of that . . . generally they are
almost always going to be returned to a situation where they
just go free, and that’s not really advancing the accountability
cause at all.
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the hope of prosecution, but by simply deporting war crime
suspects. 170 The Canadian Center for International Justice in
particular has criticized the Canadian government heavily for their
policies. 171 They see this as an abrogations not only of obligations
under international agreements to ensure prosecution, but also as
violations of the rights of the deportees themselves. 172
D.

Criticism of the United States’ Policies

Amnesty International has many of the same critiques of the
United States as it does of Canada. 173 Amnesty reports that the
United States has improved but that focusing on immigration law
solutions “isn’t ideal.” 174 Immigration- or deportation-based policies
“[don’t] help to stop atrocities,” Amnesty says. 175 “You’re sending
back someone who is a severe abuser to those countries where they
were committing those crimes.” 176
The current Director of the Human Rights and Special
Prosecution, Eli Rosenbaum, accepts the risk of deportation without
the guarantee of prosecution. 177 He also disagrees that the Geneva

170. See Sandro Contenta, At Large in Canada: Alleged War Criminals,
GLOBAL POST, Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/ne
ws/regions/americas/110824/canadas-wanted-war-criminals.
171. See Eisenbrandt Interview, supra note 115. Specifically, Eisenbrandt
worries that the targets of Canadian investigations are not the ones
Canada should be focusing on:

Id.

[T]hose really aren’t the most wanted, because if you look at the
list, these aren’t the people who they are prosecuting. These are
people who have allegations against them and we don’t
necessarily know what the evidence is. They are allegations that
these people were involved in war crimes or part of an
organization that had been involved in war crimes.

172. See id. (explaining that if someone is an alleged war criminal, Canada is
under an obligation to extradite or prosecute that person, and that
Canada’s deportation of such individuals opens the opportunity for
them to be tortured).
173. See Paloma Esquivel, U.S. Immigration Authorities Boost Efforts to
Hunt War Criminals, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, http://articles.latimes.
com/2011/oct/23/local/la-me-ice-war-crimes-20111019
(“‘The U.S.,’ [Vienna Colucci, senior policy advisor at Amnesty
International] said, ‘needs to be more willing to use criminal prosecution
at home.’”).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11 (“Normally, the priority is to
enforce US immigration law and get [the criminal] out. We try whenever
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Convention creates an obligation that could supersede US law,
creating a duty to ensure prosecution. 178 “It’s not a perfect system,”
said Rosenbaum, “so it does not provide a guarantee of fair trial or
proper treatment. But, I can’t think of a system, a workable system
that would guarantee that.” 179

V. Recommendations for the United States and
Canada
A.

Solutions Going Forward: Canada

Canada has jurisdiction to prosecute suspected war criminals and
those who committed crimes against humanity. 180 Despite this,
Canada has focused on ensuring that suspected war criminals do not
find safe haven in Canada, instead of ensuring that they are
prosecuted for their crimes. 181 If Canada is to meet its international
legal obligations, which require Canada to ensure the prosecution of
suspected war criminals, Canada must change course. Canada must
put in place legislation that ensures suspected war criminals are
prosecuted.
Canada can reach its international obligations by amending its
Immigration Statute to prohibit the removal of suspected war
criminals without a guarantee of criminal prosecution. Canada’s
Immigration Statute restricts removal of suspects if the suspect is at
risk of persecution, torture, or cruel and unusual punishment. 182 It
does not address the likelihood of a war crimes suspect being
prosecuted.
To meet its international obligations, Canada must, at a
minimum amend the Canada War Crimes Act and Immigration
Statutes to address this weakness. Hypothetical language for the
statute could read:

we can to get them prosecuted, but only in a small minority of cases do
we succeed in that.”).
178. See id. (“The Geneva Convention is not something that supersedes US
law.”)
179. Id.
180. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.).
181. See Eisenbrandt Interview, supra note 114 (noting the government’s
stated preference for deportation).
182. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, § 115 S.C. 2001, c. 27
(amended 2012) (Can.) (stating a person “shall not be removed from
Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment”).
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1) Canada shall assign agencies to search for and locate persons
suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
2) If Canada locates persons suspected of war crimes or crimes
against humanity, Canada shall:
a) prosecute the person under the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act, or
b) extradite or remove the person to a country that has
given reasonable assurance that the person shall be
prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Part 1 of the hypothetical statute addresses the mandate that
Canada seek out war criminals and human rights violators. 183 Part 2
addresses the obligation to ensure, either by prosecution or by
assurance of prosecution, that suspected war criminals do not escape
justice for their crimes. If Canada enacts a statute with this language,
or substantially similar language, and implements procedures to carry
out the new language, Canada can conform to its international
obligations.
B.

Solutions Going Forward: United States

A statutory solution in the United States is also preferable but
slightly more complicated. The United States now has the jurisdiction
to prosecute genocide, torture, and war crimes, but lacked jurisdiction
as recently as twenty years ago. 184 This creates a temporal limitation
on jurisdiction, as the United States cannot prosecute anyone for war
crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred before the statutes
were enacted. For example, the new genocide statute permits the
prosecution of any person suspected of committing genocide provided
that person is physically in the United States, 185 but the older
statutes required that the perpetrator or victim be a US citizen or the
genocide be carried out in the United States. 186 Some are hopeful the
183. See supra Part II.
184. See Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes
Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 421, 421 (2000) (noting the United States courts’ uneven
jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity).
185. Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2)(D) (2009).
186. Rosenbaum laments that the United States waited so long, until 1988,
to provide any statutory jurisdiction for the crime of genocide, and then
only with limited jurisdiction. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11.
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new jurisdiction will allow the United States to finally take the lead in
ensuring that those who commit war crimes and crimes against
humanity are brought to justice. 187 However, without a statute forcing
the hand of the United States to actually use its newfound
jurisdiction, it is likely that the United States will continue to use the
easier avenues of immigration law. 188
Hypothetical statutory language could read:
1) The United States shall assign agencies to search for and
locate persons suspected of war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
2) If the United States locates a person suspected of war crimes
or crimes against humanity, the United States shall:
a) prosecute the person under the relevant statutory
authority, or
b) extradite or remove the person to a state that has
given reasonable assurance that the person shall be
prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
3) If the United States cannot prosecute the person for lack of
temporal jurisdiction, and no other state grants reasonable
assurances that the person shall be prosecuted for war crimes or
crimes against humanity, the United States shall prosecute the
person under the next most serious charge applicable to the
person, including immigration or naturalization fraud.

This hypothetical statute forces the United States to live up to its
international obligations. 189 Part 1 of the statute mandates that the
United States locate suspected war criminals and human rights
violators. Part 2 provides the options available to the United States
that would allow it to comply with its obligation to ensure
prosecution. Part 3 deals with the tricky issue of temporal
187. Rosenbaum is among the optimistic:

Id.

As times go on as, regrettably, these crimes continue to be
committed around the world, these people will continue to come
to the United States. Eventually, we won’t be seeing cases in
which prosecution was barred because the crime was committed
before the statue went into force. I’m absolutely confident that
we will be seeing more of these cases prosecuted.

188. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (demonstrating that the prosecution of war
criminals with the statute’s jurisdiction is not mandatory).
189. See supra Part IV.
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jurisdiction. While still not fully complying with the obligation to seek
prosecution for the underlying offense, the new statute at least
guarantees human rights violators and war criminals will see some
justice, even if it is not the justice mandated by international
agreement.

VI. Conclusion
Canada and the United States have made great strides in creating
agencies to seek out and bring to justice war criminals, but they have
not gone far enough to meet their international legal obligations.
Canada and the United States have given themselves jurisdiction to
prosecute those who are enemies of all mankind and worked to deny
them safe harbor in their borders. However, it is not enough to ensure
that war criminals cannot find safe harbor. To meet the international
obligations imposed by the Geneva Conventions, the Torture
Convention, and emerging customary international law, Canada and
the United States must act to ensure that those who commit the
gravest breaches are brought to justice. Unfortunately, neither
country has sufficient procedures in place to ensure war criminals are
prosecuted for their crimes.
One possible way to ensure the prosecution of suspected war
criminals and human rights violators is to create statutes requiring all
avenues be taken to see war criminals tried for their crimes. Even
with the temporal limitations imposed in the United States, the
statutes proposed in this Note will force Canada and the United
States into compliance with their international obligations.
Canada and the United States must implement these legislative
statutes which mandate that they search for, locate, and ensure the
prosecution of suspected war criminals and human rights violators.
They must bring themselves in conformity with the international
agreements they signed and emerging customary international law. It
is no longer enough, if it ever was, to simply deny safe harbor to the
war criminals. Canada and the United States must live up to their
international obligations and end impunity for the war criminals and
human rights violators of the world.
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